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Second Response to Knittel and Smith 
 
Dermot Hayes 
 
This paper provides an additional response to the recent paper by Knittel and Smith. 
Their paper contains statements that remain untrue, and their analysis contains errors in 
basic economics and econometrics. I demonstrate that the results in all three of the papers 
written by Professor Du and myself are reasonable, and that they can be used when 
appropriately qualified.  
 
Errors 
In their response, the authors write that I did not cite errors in their first paper. I did show 
serious errors in their paper and will now describe them in more detail. 
 
Error in Basic Economics  
Knittel and Smith assume that for every one-penny change in output prices the profit of 
oil refiners also changes by one penny. This allows them to use expressions related to 
change in gasoline prices and changes in refiner’s margin interchangeably. The entire 
first half of their sensitivity results are based on this assumption.  
 
Refiners are multiple input, multiple output firms, and they have many ways to respond 
to a threat to their profits. In fact, had refiners not responded to the relative decline in 
gasoline prices they might not have survived.  
 
To see how serious an error this is, apply the same assumption to an uninsured, drought-
stricken crop producer. The result would be to conclude that profits in 2012 will be 
significantly higher than in previous years because crop prices have increased.  
 
Errors in Due Diligence 
When we estimated an equation with refiner’s margin on the left-hand side, we reported 
the results in terms of the “change in refiner’s margin.” Knittel and Smith seem to have 
missed this, and concluded that we did not report these findings. In their paper, they 
mistakenly report these results as changes in gasoline price, and then accuse us of not 
reporting the results. They go so far as to say that it is “curious” that we did not report the 
results from this model. The only reason we do not report this change in refiner’s margin 
as a gasoline price change is because we correctly realized that the two estimates were 
different. 
 
Errors in Basic Econometrics 
Of the seven alternative versions of our model that are presented in Knittel and Smith, 
four are based on the crack spread model, which as I have indicated above, does not 
explain changes in gasoline prices. The remaining three models all have crude oil on the 
left-hand side and the right-hand side of their estimated equation. In my first response I 
suggested that this will create a problem with endogeneity and bias their results. In their 
most recent response, they stand by this estimation procedure, stating “Thus, there is no 
econometric problem with including it as an explanatory variable. Even if it were 
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endogenous, that is no reason to exclude it from the analysis.” This response does not 
inform the reader that they did not correct for endogeneity.  
 
In the appendix that follows, I test for endogeneity in their regression and show that the 
exogeneity of crude oil price is rejected at the 1% level. I then correct for this 
endogeneity and show that the corrected results are similar in magnitude to our original 
results.  
 
Knittel and Smith say they recreated our model and replicated our results. They then 
present seven alternative models that purportedly show smaller results. As I have argued, 
four of these alternative models are based on their misinterpretation of the crack spread 
model, and the remaining three are biased due to endogeneity. What is missing from their 
analysis is an indication that our model could ever produce larger results. In the appendix 
to this paper I show that reasonable changes to our model structure provide larger results. 
If Knittel and Smith estimated versions of the model that had larger coefficients, they had 
an obligation to report them. 
 
In the last section of their paper, Knittel and Smith present a set of equations with 
employment, natural gas, and age on the left-hand side. They then use our energy-based 
controls variables, while omitting relevant variables that might be expected to influence 
employment, natural gas, and age. Because our control variables were selected with 
reference to the energy market, they have no place in an equation that explains 
employment, natural gas, or age. In the absence of suitable controls, their regressions are 
obviously designed to find correlation between ethanol production and their dependent 
variable.  
 
If Knittel and Smith truly are interested in objectively comparing models, they should do 
the following: 
1. Include relevant control variables for each of the left-hand side variables and then 
report the significance of the ethanol production term.  
2. Show that the model can explain employment at the regional level as we have done 
with ethanol.  
3. Drop the first two years of data, and add two years of new data and show that the 
results are robust. 
 
 
Our two gasoline price updates 
The most recent response by Knittel and Smith shifts attention away from our peer 
reviewed 2009 paper to the two updates we published as working papers. In my first 
response, I focused my efforts in showing that the model and econometrics in our 2009 
paper were correct. I did this because the two updates use the same model and the same 
data series as the original paper. The updates simply drop two years of older data and add 
two years of new data to measure the updated coefficients.  
 
In their response Knittel and Smith state about my first response that “he offers no 
defense of the $0.89 and $1.09 numbers.” This is untrue. In my first response I present a 
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graph that shows that the crack ratio has declined by about 30% throughout the 
estimation period. This relative decline in relative gasoline price motivated our work and 
is a key reason for the results we obtain. The continuation of the pattern in the more 
recent data supports the hypothesis that the same forces are in play throughout the period.  
 
I had assumed that the reader would be able to apply a 30% price adjustment to current 
wholesale gasoline prices to see that the $0.89 and $1.09 numbers are reasonable. 
 
Let me run the calculation. The average crack ratio from January 1986 to December 1999 
was 1.56. The average crack ratio in the period from January 2008 to May 2012 was 1.19. 
In order to bring the crack ratio in the recent period up to the level of the historic period, 
the crack ratio needs to increase by 31%. This means that if wholesale gasoline prices had 
maintained their level relative to crude oil in the pre ethanol period they would be 31% 
higher than they are today. With wholesale gasoline selling in excess of $3.14 per gallon, 
a 31% price increase represents an amount that is exactly in the range we reported.    
 
But the marginal results are valid only if the forces that drove the estimated results 
remained in place for the entire period and if the impact is linear. So the use of these 
results must be qualified. As I mentioned in my first response, we provided ample and 
strong qualifications for the use of this procedure. Knittel and Smith attempt to refute our 
use of a qualifier by citing our description of the large results as reasonable. I do not see 
why a qualifier is made redundant by describing results as reasonable.  
 
Inconsistency 
In my first response, I argued that the refiner’s margin need not have fallen penny-for-
penny with gasoline prices and showed that the profit they made from other distillates 
had increased. Knittel and Smith respond that “we would conjecture that increased 
demand for clean‐burning diesel vehicles, primarily in Europe, explains this 
phenomenon.” 
 
This line of argument is completely inconsistent. If stronger demand for diesel allowed 
refiners to charge more for diesel, then: 
1. How can they then conclude that the refiner’s margin adjusts penny for penny with 
gasoline price? 
2. If one can argue that refiners adjust the source of their margins based on stronger 
demand, then why do Knittel and Smith oppose the concept that softer demand for 
gasoline would not cause the refiners to adjust in the other direction?  
3. If demand for gasoline did not soften, why then did the refiners not maintain their 
gasoline margin? 
 
The Funding Issue 
In my first response I indicated that it was highly unusual to say who is not funding a 
paper. Their response is that their disclosure statement is now standard practice. If this 
were true, then the same statement would be applied in their other working papers. None 
of the current working papers listed on their respective websites includes this disclosure.  
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Conclusions 
Knittel and Smith present seven alternative versions of our model, all of which apparently 
show a lower impact of ethanol production on gasoline prices. Four of these models are 
based on the flawed assumption that one can use the change in refiner’s margin and the 
change in gasoline prices interchangeably. The remaining three models all suffer from an 
obvious endogeneity problem, which when corrected produces results that are similar to 
ours. What is then left of their paper is a series of entirely unrelated regressions where 
they regress unrelated variables against each other without appropriate controls, and with 
predictable results. I believe that the magnitude of all our results are reasonable and that 
they can be used in the current policy debates surrounding ethanol. Our results show that 
the closure of ethanol plants may have a serious impact on gasoline prices. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Alternative specifications of our model that generate larger price impacts 
 
Using the data from January 2000 to December 2010 as in Du and Hayes (2011) and 
Knittel and Smith, I now:  
 
(i) Add an explanatory variable measuring regional percent utilization of refinery 
operating capacity. The inclusion of this variable increases the estimated 
coefficient of ethanol production from -0.0000181 to -0.0000185. See Table 1. 
(ii) Replace the included regional imports of finished motor gasoline with US 
finished motor gasoline imports. This increases the estimate to -0.0000201. 
(iii) Combine the changes in (i) and (ii). This further increases the estimate to -
0.0000204. 
 
All these data are available to anyone with an interest, and I encourage the running of 
alternative model specifications to see how easy it is to find a larger estimate.  
 
The Endogeneity Issue in Knittel and Smith’s Crack Ratio Model 
 
Knittel and Smith included crude oil prices on both sides of the crack ratio model and in 
my original response, I pointed out that there is an obvious endogeneity problem with this 
specification. I also indicated that this will generate biased estimates of the model 
parameters.  
To test and correct for this endogeneity, one first needs to find a valid instrumental 
variable that is correlated with the crude oil prices, but also exogenous to the model. Here 
the price of natural gas is a valid choice. Natural gas prices are strongly correlated with 
5 
 
the oil prices (see Figure 1), and it is reasonable to assume that the price of natural gas 
does not affect the price of gasoline relative to crude oil.  
In the results shown in Table 2, I used the natural gas price, deflated by the consumer 
price index, as a proxy for the real crude oil prices. I then we use two-stage least squares 
to formally test for the endogeneity of crude oil price. The estimation results are reported 
in Table 2.  
The F test statistic for excluded instruments (421.31) indicates that the real natural gas 
price is a good instrument for the real oil price. The crude oil price is found to be 
endogenous with the exogeneity hypothesis rejected at 0.01% level, and an endogeneity 
test statistic of 16.238.  
The results in column (III) of Table 2 show that when I use the real natural gas price as a 
proxy for crude oil price, the estimated gasoline price impact is similar to the original 
estimate in our updated paper.  
Also, after taking into account the endogeneity of crude oil prices using two-stage least 
squares, ethanol production has a statistically significant impact on gasoline prices and 
the magnitude of the impact increases from -0.00000992 in column (II) (the Knittel and 
Smith model) to -0.0000120 in column (IV).  
 
I also added a lagged dependent variable to the model after taking into account the 
endogeneity of crude oil price. The results are reported in columns (V) and (VI) of Table 
2. These results show smaller coefficients on the ethanol production and statistically 
significant lagged effects because the model attempts to capture dynamic features of the 
process. The results indicate that the “total effects” are realized in about three months and 
are in the similar magnitude to the previous static specifications.  
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Table 1. Estimation results for the crack ratio model using alternative specifications 
 Du and Hayes 
(2011) 
Specification (i): 
add in regional 
capacity 
utilization percent 
Specification (ii): 
replace regional 
gas imports by US 
imports 
Specification 
(iii): combine 
changes in (i) 
and (ii) 
Oil stock 3.42e-06*** 3.39e-06*** 3.15e-06*** 3.14e-06*** 
Gasoline stock -3.62e-07 -4.96e-08 -1.93e-07 1.11e-07 
Equivalent Refinery 
capacity 
1.18e-06 7.74e-07 1.00e-06 6.99e-07 
Utilize percent  -0.001  -0.001 
Ethanol production -.0000181*** -.0000185*** -.0000201*** -.0000204*** 
Supply disruption 0.09** 0.08** 0.13** 0.12** 
Gasoline import -6.58e-06** -5.78e-06** -5.59e-06** -5.21e-06** 
HHI 5.13e-06 1.79e-06 5.96e-05 5.01e-05 
January 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001 
February 0.01 0.006 0.006 0.002 
March 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
April 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
May 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
June 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
July 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** .07*** 
August 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** .07*** 
September 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** .07*** 
October 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
November 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.009 
        
Note: Single (*), double (*), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. Estimation results for the endogeneity of crude oil price in the crack ratio model 
 I II III IV V VI 
 Du and Hayes 
(2011) 
Add real crude 
oil price as 
explanatory 
variable 
Use real NG 
price as proxy 
for oil price 
Use real NG 
price as IV 
Use real NG 
price as proxy 
for oil price + 
lagged 
dependent 
variable 
Use real NG 
price as IV + 
lagged 
dependent 
variable 
Lagged dependent     0.68*** 0.63*** 
Oil stock 3.42e-06*** 1.17e-06* 2.23e-06*** 1.74e-06*** 6.49e-07 5.62e-07 
Gasoline stock -3.62e-07 -3.59e-06*** -2.89e-06* -2.77e-06* -5.56e-06*** -5.32e-06*** 
Refinery capacity 1.18e-06 1.10e-05*** 7.16e-06*** 8.54e-06*** 4.59e-06*** 5.30e-06*** 
Real oil price  -0.84***  -0.63***  -0.24*** 
Real NG price   -4.30***  -1.52***  
Ethanol production -.0000181*** -.00000992*** -.0000184*** -.0000120*** -.00000609*** -0.00000436*** 
Supply disruption 0.09** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
Gasoline import -6.58e-06** -1.50e-06 -2.98e-06 -2.79e-06** -1.82e-06 -1.81e-06 
HHI 5.13e-06 9.81e-05*** 6.31e-05* 7.44e-05** 1.9e-05 2.63e-05 
January 0.004 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.05*** 0.05*** 
February 0.01 0.03 0.003 0.02 0.04** 0.04*** 
March 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
April 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 
May 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
June 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.01 0.03* 
July 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.09*** -0.01 0.007 
August 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.04* 0.09*** 0.01 0.03** 
September 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.04* 0.09*** 0.03* 0.05*** 
October 0.03 0.04 0.004 0.04*** -0.03* -0.01 
November 0.007 0.02 -0.00009 0.02 -0.01 -0.005 
    “Total” effect -0.0000190 -0.0000118 
        
Note: (1) Single (*), double (*), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. (2) The IV estimation and tests are conducted using the STATA 
xtivreg2 command.  
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Figure 1. Crude oil and natural gas prices, Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2010. 
Source: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm#prices 
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